

confirm the diversity and the typology of laughings as some also evident subject of a special laugh theory – the gelology.

The National Laughings, this main source of untranslatability as a property of a text, or of any utterance, in one language, for which no equivalent text or utterance can be found in another language, is the most evident subject of gelology. “A ghastly idea” (Nabokov) of Gogol’s *The Inspector* as “the old rascal’s nightmare” is not far from reality of Gogol’s interpretations in the modern European theatre – and too far from reality of the Ukrainian “anti-corruption” laughing (so actual nowadays). The “lyubi-druzi-corruption” (the Ukrainian untranslatable “corruption of the best friends”) continues to manifest itself in an unending stream of falsifications, a “logic” of which is clearly shown in Gogol’s “funny things”. As Gogol said, such a “funny thing” would not demand some special “comic” efforts: it would “show itself by itself”. Paradoxically, the real wit of *The Inspector* emerges in a “funny thing” that seemed absolutely serious to its author – his Russian Imperial state-mentality. Gogol’s profound awareness of “the Highest Statesmen” that, for him, were the rallied collective of adherents, was really confirmed in the spectator’s reaction of his only true adherent – the Imperior Himself, who proved His Highest Understanding with His Homeric Laugh during all the premiere performance of *The Inspector*. Nowadays the humor connotations of *The Inspector* are evidently connected with everlasting reanimation of Gogol’s satiric characters: in our Ukrainian reality the resulting goo gained consciousness and became an indistructible gelatinous mass.

Keywords: gelology, laughing, wit, humor, satire, irony, sarcasmus, the “lyubi-druzi-corruption”, state-mentality, Gogol, *The Inspector*.

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Maksim Vak

THE SUSPICION OF THE POSSIBILITY FOR A DIALOGUE OF CONSCIOUSNESSES IN DOSTOEVSKY

The article is devoted to researches of dialogue of consciousnesses in Dostoevsky’s philosophy and literature creativity. The ideas of M. Bakhtin and E. Levinas are methodological basis of the investigation. Bakhtin presents the novelty of Dostoevsky’s writing almost as a paradox of a divine creation – Dostoevsky creates his heroes in such a way that they are free from their creator, and Dostoevsky does not have the last, determined word concerning their destiny. They keep their secrets from him as though he did not create them. This situation, if Bakhtin is right, gives rise to disturbing questions concerning how to read these novels. We have analyzed a lot of the most significant moments in the novels we can say the same concerning all the examples that Bakhtin presents in order to demonstrate the dialogical structure of Dostoevsky’s writings. For our opinion Bakhtin’s analysis of style and structure is fine and perceptive but he does not pay attention to the fact that the main problem is not in the presence of this structure but in the question of the possibility of its presence. Sooner, the dialogical structure is present in Dostoevsky’s writings despite the impossibility of dialogue. One hears the other despite the impossibility to hear the other. One of the central problems is how it is possible to hear the other if one hears only oneself; how it is possible to address the other if there is only my ego, my consciousness that always hears out of itself and assimilates the other. It is not the dialogue, but the impossible possibility of dialogue that creates the climate of Dostoevsky’s novels. To demonstrate this we have followed Bakhtin in his analyses of Dostoevsky’s discourse.

Keewords: dialogue, presence, Dostoevsky, Bakhtin.

At the opening of our reading of Dostoevsky after Levinas we would like to concentrate on something that can be vaguely called the climate of Dostoevsky’s writings. M. Bakhtin, perhaps one of Dostoevsky’s most perceptive readers, in his attention to Dostoevsky’s style caught the feeling of this particular climate. Despite our disagreement with Bakhtin’s general approach – his analysis of the dialogues of consciousness constituting polyphony in Dostoevsky’s novels – and suspicion of his assumption of the possibility of a clear distinction between dialogue and monologue, we would like to address and repeat with different accents many of his insights, entering into a dialogue with Bakhtin about Dostoevsky.

In justifying his attention to Dostoevsky’s poetics, Bakhtin notes a surprising similarity in readings of Dostoevsky’s novels that miss the point.

Rather than arguing with the author, these (mis) readings argue with the novels' heroes, approaching the novels as if they were written by Raskolnikov, the underground man, Myshkin, Ivan Karamazov, and so on. Bakhtin takes this to be the result of an approach that presupposes that the author has a main idea which he wishes to express, and begins its work by finding the protagonist who is the carrier of this idea. The critics whom Bakhtin criticizes start with an established perspective with which they proceed to diagnose the writing. As a result there is an enormous diversity in readings of Dostoevsky himself (which in itself calls into question the possibility of an authentic reading of Dostoevsky's novels) – as critical realist just stopping short of social realism, nihilist, to extreme idealistic mystic. It seems that each of the readers can present the justification of his point of view if Dostoevsky's novels are traditional novels where an author's dominating idea is expressed by a determined character, where there is a separation between the conceived idea and its expression, the hero's position and his action. But sooner, as Bakhtin argues, all readers who try to conceive Dostoevsky's novels from this traditional perspective miss the point because there is no dominating voice organizing the novels, but many voices in constant conversation. These critics fail to adequately read Dostoevsky's novels since they do not hear the alternating voices and do not appreciate the inadequacy of the authorial voice in giving a final world, this voice being one more voice among many. These critics miss the novelty of Dostoevsky's writings that is in the freedom of his heroes, in the author's distancing from them. Bakhtin presents the novelty of Dostoevsky's writing almost as a paradox of a divine creation – Dostoevsky creates his heroes in such a way that they are free from their creator, and Dostoevsky does not have the last, determined word concerning their destiny. They keep their secrets from him as though he did not create them. This situation, if Bakhtin is right, gives rise to disturbing questions concerning how to read these novels: should not our critical reading and determination of the novel follow Dostoevsky's way of creating so that in our reading we are as though not in control of what we read? and do we have the right to have a privileged position by dialogically determining heroes and the novels? Bakhtin does not consider the awkward position of the reader of Dostoevsky. It is this that probably gives rise to what we take to be his misreading of Dostoevsky.

One of the central issues in our attempt to enter into the climate of Dostoevsky's writings is Bakhtin's insight concerning the mode of "as though divine creation" of Dostoevsky's novels. Despite Bakhtin's awareness of the novelty of Dostoevsky's writings and the brilliant demonstration of this novelty through a comparison of the writings of Dostoevsky and Tolstoy, Bakhtin's approach is traditional. Even his dubbing of Dostoevsky's novelty as a

Copernican revolution betrays the traditionality of his approach. Dostoevsky "took what had been a firm finalizing authorial definition and turned it into an aspect of the hero's self-definition" [1, p. 49]. Characters of the novels define themselves in their search for identity. For Bakhtin the 'I think' of the author that is traditionally the focal point that constitutes the novel (and consequently for critics it is the point which should be found to grasp the novel) is disseminated among the characters. Dostoevsky as an author keeps his distance from them by speaking with them, not about them. This is possible because the characters are free, and they are free because Dostoevsky let them be, almost like a divinity, and allows them to become according to their being, to the law of their being. Despite his reservations (which are numerous and may be the most interesting elements of Bakhtin's writing) Bakhtin assumes that a primordial and rational law determines the characters. The question about the freedom of the freedom to become that is bound by law never occurs to the critic (despite the fact that such freedom is always under investigation in Dostoevsky's novels). Instead of questioning the value of such freedom, he demonstrates that the heroes speak back to Dostoevsky, that their consciousnesses are not encompassed by Dostoevsky's consciousness. (Bakhtin never wonders whether this speaking back is not conditioned by Dostoevsky's spitefulness which encompasses all the heroes' responses to him. After all, maybe, there are not heroes who speak back, but only Dostoevsky who argues with himself out of spite through his heroes.) All the heroes, according to Bakhtin, are in a dialogue with each other and with the author. Dostoevsky "never retains any essential "surplus" of meaning" [1, p. 73]. As a result dialogues are neither finalized nor objectified in Dostoevsky, and are never rhetorically performed. To illustrate this structure and the system of relationships that creates Dostoevsky's novels Bakhtin offers as an example a 'microdialogue' that Raskolnikov has at the beginning of *Crime and Punishment*. Raskolnikov receives a letter from his mother in which she recounts what happened with his sister Dunya, trying to conceal the real intention of Dunya's marriage. Her game of concealment is so awkward that it leaves one to wonder whether she really wants to conceal the truth – Dunya sacrifices herself for her brother – or to expose it, or, maybe, her game of concealment is an attempt to hide the truth from herself. Raskolnikov sees her game. He repeats his mother's words, challenging them to a dialogue (for which they are not intended) twisting them around, exposing their hidden meaning. He is almost elated by the consciousness of his exposition of his mother, and sister's little tricks. He does not shun the truth of Dunya's sacrificing for him. And taking a noble pose he rejects Dunya's sacrifice – marrying a man whom she does not love for Raskolnikov's sake:

‘There can be no question of love,’ mother writes. And what if there can be no respect either, If on the contrary there is aversion, contempt, repulsion, what then? So you will have to ‘keep up appearance,’ too. Is not that so? Do you know what that smartness means? Do you understand that the Luzhin smartness is just the same thing as Sonya’s and may be worse, viler, baser (ϊϊääää) [1, p. 49], because in your case, Dunya, its’ a bargain for luxuries, after all, but with Sonya it’s simply a question of starvation. It has to be paid for, it has to be paid for, Dunya, this smartness. And what if it’s more than you can bear afterwards, if you regret it? The bitterness, the misery, the curses, the tears hidden from all the world, for you are not a Marfa Petrovna. And how will your mother feel then? Even now she is uneasy, she is worried, but then, when she sees it all clearly? And I? Yes, indeed, what have you taken me for? I won’t have your sacrifice, Dunya, I won’t have it, mother! It shall not be, so long as I am alive, shall not, it shall not! I won’t accept it” [...]

“Or throw up life altogether!” he cried suddenly, in a frenzy – “accept one’s lot humbly as it is, once for all and stifle everything in oneself, giving up all claim to activity, life and love!”

“Do you understand, sir, do you understand what it means when you have absolutely nowhere to turn?” Marmeladov’s question came suddenly into his mind, “for every man must have somewhere to turn” [2, p. 44-45].

All voices, according to Bakhtin, are dialogized in Raskolnikov’s voice. All main characters of the novels – Sonya, Marmeladov, Luzhin, Svidrigailov, Raskolnikov’s sister and mother - are introduced in this ‘interior’ dialogue. “And all these future major characters of the novel are already reflected here in Raskolnikov’s consciousness, they have entered into a thoroughly dialogized interior monologue, entered with their own “truths,” with their own positions in life, and Raskolnikov has entered into a fundamental and intense interior dialogue with them, a dialogue of ultimate questions and ultimate life decisions. From the very beginning he already knows everything, takes everything into account, anticipates everything. He has already entered into dialogic contact with the whole of life surrounding him” [1, p. 74]. However, it seems that this example of ‘dialogization’ can be interpreted in a completely different way (and it seems that this other way, as any of Dostoevsky’s ‘underground men’ could spitefully say, sounds even more plausible), and this possibility of a different interpretation may make us wonder whether seeing Dostoevsky’s novels through the perspective of a dialogue of consciousnesses, where the focal point of the novels is disseminated among characters, is enough to solve the problem of the ‘as though divine’ mode of creation of Dostoevsky’s novels. Are not these different voices that speak in Raskolnikov’s mind only one voice? Are not the different voices synchronized, and this dialogue turned into a monologue?

Are not the different voices that Dostoevsky presents synchronized in his mind, which dominates and determines these voices? What if the unsettled argumentation of the unsettled voices which Bakhtin sees as speaking back to their creator merely betray Dostoevsky’s failure to organize the voices in a properly systematic way? Maybe the readers that often criticize Dostoevsky for his chaotic style are right, and there is no novelty in Dostoevsky, but simply poor grasp of his subjects; not a new style, but a bad style, and Bakhtin’s explanation of Dostoevsky’s chaotic style as a dialogical style is only a fine attempt to cover up Dostoevsky’s failure as a stylist. And we have to return to the old model of reading Dostoevsky – he has interesting ideas that are expressed in a clumsy way. However if we try to examine his ideas as for example J. P. Scanlan does in his book *Dostoevsky the Thinker* (see: [4]) we are bound for the discovery that Dostoevsky’s ideas are rather trite, and are definitely surpassed by Scanlan’s meticulous explanation of their meanings. His observant enumeration of Dostoevsky’s good and bad arguments with indication that Dostoevsky was not a good scholar but a bad nationalist, do not leave room for admiration for Dostoevsky’s ideas. At best we can find in Dostoevsky some interesting illustrations of some interesting failures of some interesting arguments.

If we were to follow Bakhtin and try to understand everything that takes place in the novels from the perspective of dialogue between consciousnesses we would have to say that Dostoevsky’s novels rather demonstrate the deafness of consciousness and the impossibility of hearing the other. Consciousness and the intentional approach, as Levinas argues in many of his works, always betrays the voice of the other and assimilates it. Raskolnikov’s repetition of his mother’s phrases in the above passage is an example of this. Raskolnikov hears what he wants to hear. His hearing is conditioned by his consciousness. We can hear (if we are not deaf) the deafness to the other, the impossibility for a dialogue, and the reduction of all dialogues to monologue throughout all of Dostoevsky’s writings. Rather than the communication of consciousnesses that Bakhtin insists creates Dostoevsky’s poetics, it is the constant failures of communication and communication in its failure that creates the climate of Dostoevsky’s writings. Raskolnikov’s hearing and his interpretation of his mother’s, Semyon Zakharovich Marmeladov’s and Sonya’s voices in the quoted passage are already heavily inflected by his ideology. It is probably not an accident that Bakhtin in his long quotation omits the part where Raskolnikov’s ideological perspective is stated clearly for the first time. But to understand Raskolnikov’s reading of the letter and the disturbance that it brings we cannot ignore this perspective. Only from this perspective can we appreciate the significance of the last paragraph that Bakhtin quotes (beginning “Or throw

up life altogether!”) that in Bakhtin’s quoting can be wrongly read as a reply to his mother and sister’s little tricks:

It won’t happen? And how are you going to keep it from happening? Forbid it? What right do you have? What can you promise them in return for such a right? To devote your whole fate, your whole future to them, *once you finish your studies and find a position?* We’ve heard that before, but it’s still a *blind deal*, and what about now? It’s necessary to do something, do you understand? And what are you doing now? You’re fleecing them. Because they get the money on the credit of a hundred-ruble pension, or as an advance from the Svidrigailovs! How are you going to protect them from the Svidrigailovs, from Afanasy Ivanovich Vakhroushin, you future millionaire, you Zeus disposing of their fates? In ten years? But in ten years your mother will go blind from those kerchiefs, and maybe from tears as well; she’ll waste away with fasting; and your sister? Go on, think what may happen to your sister after ten years, or during those ten years. Have you guessed?

He kept tormenting and taunting himself with these questions, even taking a certain delight in it. None of the questions was new or sudden, however; they were all old, sore, long-standing. They had begun torturing him long ago and had worn out his heart. Long, long ago this present anguish had been born in him, had grown, accumulated, and ripened recently and become concentrated, taking the form of horrible, wild, and fantastic question that tormented his heart and mind, irresistibly demanding resolution. And now his mother’s letter suddenly struck him like a thunderbolt. Clearly, he now had not to be anguished, not to suffer passively by mere reasoning about unresolvable questions, but to do something without fail, at once, quickly. Decide at all costs to do at least something, or.... [2, p. 44].

Raskolnikov’s position, declared in this passage and shared by many other characters in Dostoevsky’s novels, is the position of the one who refuses ‘to play in a drama which outcome he does not know’ [3, p. 78]. In *Brothers Karamazov* this position is radically articulated by Ivan Karamazov as his returning his ticket to God. Dostoevsky’s heroes refuse to participate in a hypocritical play enacted by society. Raskolnikov’s tormenting monologue is the revealing of the mendaciousness of this play. His reading of the letter is his hearing the mendacious voice of his mother, playing her base role (*ἡἄἔῶῖ δἰἔῶ*), concealing its baseness (*ἡἄἔἡἡῶῖ*) under the well worn cover of traditions and habits. But he is not going to be deceived by his mother’s tricks. He sees through them. He exposes with delight his mother’s cunning. However, in this seeing through his mother’s tricks he misses what is most essential in the letter – her appeal to him for help, her appeal to him not to judge too severely but to hear that there is nowhere to go and that it is better to lie than

to continue their present life. Raskolnikov’s heroic position that refuses any compromise, that demands that one either to be honest and to refuse the participation in a hypocritical game or be a scoundrel (*ἡἄἔῶῖ*), is the position of one who situates himself between being and nothingness, who does not allow himself to hear the appeal of the widow, the weak and the destitute.

This failure to hear, to be in a dialogue, leads Arkady from *The Adolescent* to constantly misunderstand his father, mother and sister. The scandals that he is exposed to are the result of this impossibility to be in a dialogue. In fact, each character in the novel hears what he wants to hear. We witness the same thing in the scandalous atmosphere of the *Idiot*. In this respect, the scene of the meeting that happens between Nastasya Fillipovna and Aglaya is especially revealing. In the *Brothers Karamazov* the deafness to the other results in the murder of the Father - the knot of the plot of the novel.

We have only addressed a few, though probably the most significant, moments in the novels but we can say the same concerning all the examples that Bakhtin presents in order to demonstrate the dialogical structure of Dostoevsky’s writings. His analyses of the representation of Raskolnikov’s article [1, p. 101–112] in a dialogue that takes place between the detective investigator Porfiry Petrovich and Raskolnikov during their first meeting should be an example not of the dialogic rendering of the article’s idea and the constitution of its meaning in some interspaces, but an example of the impossibility to adequately represent any idea. Any representation becomes a distortion. Raskolnikov, despite his awareness of Porfiry Petrovich’s intentional exaggeration of the article, takes up the challenge to make this exaggeration even more pronounced in order to show that he is not afraid of Porfiry Petrovich’s trap. But in result we have only an exaggeration of an exaggeration, and something that was never stated in the article suddenly appears under the provocation. But this apparition is not the revelation of the truth, but one more mask. There is the feeling that something that was never actually thought by Raskolnikov materializes there, invades, subjects and exposes Raskolnikov despite his attempt to uphold himself and withhold himself, to keep himself from being exposed. But what is exposed is not Raskolnikov’s hidden face – his subconsciousness, his underground –, but ef-facing. The meeting is also a wonderful example of the distortion of the order necessary for a dialogue, a communication, a conversation, as if despite Bakhtin’s attempt to present what take place as a dialogue. For Raskolnikov the whole meeting can be reduced to two questions: Did Porfiry Petrovich wink at him or not? And if he did, what does it mean? The meeting is as though winking at us, mocking any attempts to say clearly what is happening – who is a deceiver and who is deceived. This winking, which Bakhtin ignores, undoes the possibility of any certainty of an

intentional approach and of communication that is synchronized by intentionality, by the ego's power that is in its 'I think' by the modus of 'I can.' This winking presents the structure of distortion, when the idea is neither revealed in a dialogue nor concealed. It enters into an indefinite play of revealing-concealing. The representation of Raskolnikov's idea at Porfiry Pertrovich's place is one of the many examples of this distortion. The same distortion as a result of exposition to the other and as the impossibility to reveal we see in the underground man's presentation of his idea when each representation is concluded with 'not that,' or in Raskolnikov's revealing of his idea to Sonya, or in Kirillov's revealing of his idea, or in Stavrogin's confession, or in Ivan's arguing with his demon, or in Shatov's confession, or in the representation of Ivan's ideas during the conversation in the monastery, the tavern, etc. All these revelations and confessions addressed to the other are concluded with the same desperate 'not that' of the underground man. (All of these personages are homeless people from the underground). The distortions that we witness during the representations of ideas (and it seems that these representations in being converted by critical readings into representations of Dostoevsky's novels multiply the distortions) in different conversations makes us question one of Bakhtin's main assumptions sustaining the view of Dostoevsky's novels as polyphonic and dialogical novels, the assumption that an idea lives in conversation with other ideas somewhere in between consciousnesses that are in dialogue. What is born out of this 'in between' is only a distortion of the consciousnesses between which is this 'in between'. Where is this mythical in between? Is not this 'in between' another consciousness - the consciousness of the reader, the critic - that only distorts what the others try to say? Bakhtin, who breaks with the traditional way of analyzing the heroes of Dostoevsky's novels as the productions of Dostoevsky's consciousness, in which to get at the truth about the heroes is to figure out the author's intentions (conscious or subconscious), remains faithful to the idea that the truth can be consciously and intentionally represented. Despite Bakhtin's intricate construction of a space in between consciousnesses, where this truth abides, this truth remains the truth of Bakhtin's consciousness. Bakhtin, revealing the impossibility of a final word for the tortured underground men's consciousnesses, which run against themselves running out of breath, finalizes it as a dialogue. Bakhtin, in spite of his realization that there is no final word, pronounces the final word that there is no final word. Bakhtin enters into the spiral movement of spite that animates the consciousnesses of Dostoevsky's heroes and represents this spiral as the final word of Dostoevsky's novel.

Bakhtin's dialogical understanding of Dostoevsky's novels rests on two assumptions that he takes for granted, that there is clear access to the other's consciousness and that there is an 'in between' of consciousnesses where all voices are synchronized. But these conditions on which Bakhtin's approach rests as well as conditionality itself and possibility of the rest and ground are the biggest problems of Dostoevsky's writings. If only Dostoevsky's underground men could rest on a dialogue they would be happy. Then if somebody would ask them 'who are you' they could proudly answer 'we are born out of dialogue and we are dialogical men'. They would turn being in dialogue into their careers and drink to dialogue.

Bakhtin in paying exclusive attention to structure, in which he finds the uniqueness and significance of Dostoevsky's novels, does not notice Raskolnikov's own testimony at the end of his reading of the letter from his mother against an understanding of this reading as a dialogue of consciousnesses, against the possibility of the alterity that is an indispensable requirement of dialogue for Raskolnikov. With this he misses what is perhaps one of the central problems of Dostoevsky's writing: the conditionality/conventionality¹ of everything. Raskolnikov repeats with exasperation the phrase that he recently heard from Marmeladov: 'there's nowhere to go'. But he repeats it with a new accent and a new meaning that is conditioned by Raskolnikov's position expressed in the passage omitted by Bakhtin. His consciousness is an all-encompassing totality and everything that he represents is already conditioned by his consciousness. No matter how much effort he puts into getting out of his consciousness, by listening to other voices, he cannot get outside of himself. The effort only reveals the lag between ego and self. In the effort all the meaninglessness of the undertaking and breaking through is revealed. He is committed to himself. The murder that Raskolnikov commits, or his experiment and daring as he dubs it, cannot be understood without this maddening 'there's nowhere to go', the monological seclusion that cannot be broken through, this reign of something – laws, the wall, concepts, universals, habits that are the manifestations of people's baseness (ἰᾰᾰᾰᾰᾰᾰ) – that encompasses one and makes him want to lie, to flee. Raskolnikov's soliloquy is, as are many other heroes', testimony to the undeniable structure of the totality of conditionality, of the unceasing rumbling of 'there is' of being that conditions even Raskolnikov's attempt to escape from the conditionality/conventionality of norms, laws, habits, being. We will later pay in our analyses of interiorization special attention to the desperation of 'there's nowhere to go' that evinces the metaphysical structure of the psyche in Dostoevsky's novels. Now, reading Dostoevsky with Bakhtin, we only refer to this phrase to demonstrate that Bakhtin's representation of the structure of

Dostoevsky's novels as dialogical based on the assumption of the presence of the other and the possibility of access to his consciousness and the space in between, is very questionable. There firstly should be the question of whether there is the other. As Bakhtin notices himself the most common conclusion of 'microdialogue' and 'macrodialogue' that occurs in the novel is 'a lie upon a lie'. Almost all conversations are permeated by ruse on both sides. Each interlocutor plays his own game and wants to get inside the other's mind 'as though by burglary' [3, p. 67], that is, on his own terms and conditions. Even when a dialogue takes place inside one's mind constituting 'microdialogue' there is the same game permeated by ruse. The underground man, Raskolnikov, Svidrigailov, Stepan Verkhovensky, prince Myshkin, Ivan Karamazov, the heroes that have these 'microdialogues' more often than the others, exclaim unanimously at the end of their seminal 'microdialogues' 'oh, it's not that', sometimes with feelings of despair but more often with feelings of shame. Bakhtin's analysis of style and structure is fine and perceptive but he does not pay attention to the fact that the main problem is not in the presence of this structure but in the question of the possibility of its presence. Sooner, the dialogical structure is present in Dostoevsky's writings despite the impossibility of dialogue. One hears the other despite the impossibility to hear the other. One of the central problems is how it is possible to hear the other if one hears only oneself; how it is possible to address the other if there is only my ego, my consciousness that always hears out of itself and assimilates the other. It is not the dialogue, but the impossible possibility of dialogue that creates the climate of Dostoevsky's novels. To demonstrate this we will follow Bakhtin in his analyses of discourse as though interrupting him, repeating his words (as Bakhtin point out, incessant repetition is a stylistic attribute of Dostoevsky's novels that puts individual expressions into dialogue with themselves as they are repeated with new accents) with a different accent. In our reading of Bakhtin reading Dostoevsky we will introduce the voices of other readers of Dostoevsky – Nietzsche, Levinas, and Shestov.

Notes

¹ In Russian the word 'óñĕĭĭĭñòü' has two meanings: conditional and conventional. We would like to keep both meanings, both of which are important in bringing out the play of meanings that occurs in Dostoevsky's novels when characters state, 'ĕñĕ óñĕĭĭĭ' (everything is conventional/conditional).

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Максим Вак

ПРЕДПОЛОЖЕНИЕ ВОЗМОЖНОСТИ ДЛЯ ДИАЛОГА СОЗНАНИЙ У ДОСТОЕВСКОГО

Статья посвящена исследованию диалога сознаний в философии и литературном творчестве Достоевского. Идеи М. Бахтина и Э. Левинаса являются методологической основой исследования. Одной из центральных проблем является то, как можно услышать другого, если человек слышит только себя; как можно обращаться к другому, если есть только мое эго, мое сознание, которое всегда слышит из самого себя и ассимилирует другого. Это не есть еще диалог, но только возможность диалога, которая и создает атмосферу романов Достоевского. Чтобы продемонстрировать это, мы следуем за Бахтиным в его анализе дискурса Достоевского. Ключевые слова: диалог, присутствие, Достоевский, Бахтин.

Максим Вак

ПРИПУЩЕННЯ МОЖЛИВОСТІ ДЛЯ ДІАЛОГУ СВДОМОСТІЙ У ТВОРЧОСТІ ДОСТОЄВСЬКОГО

Стаття присвячена дослідженню діалогу свідомостей в філософії і літературній творчості Достоевського. Ідеї М. Бахтіна і Е. Левінаса є методологічною основою дослідження. Однією з центральних проблем є те, як можна почути іншого, якщо людина чує тільки себе; як можна звертатися до іншого, якщо є тільки моє Еґо, моя свідомість, яка завжди чує самого себе та асимілює іншого. Це ще не є діалог, але тільки можливість діалогу, яка і створює атмосферу романів Достоевського. Щоб продемонструвати це, ми слідуємо за Бахтіним в його аналізі дискурсу Достоевського.

Ключові слова: діалог, присутність, Достоевський, Бахтін.